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GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION
CHARGES.-PART II.
The Right to Inatefer.
A. The Attitude of the Courts in the "Due Process" and
Pursuit" Cases.
In taking up the first of our two inquiries, "Has a govern-
ment the right to dictate the terms of the contracts of its sub-
jects," we encounter a problem peculiarly American, in that
here the question is judicial rather than legislative, and in-
volves a discussion of the .0ower to pass any proposed law, as
well as the poliy of doing so. The American people, before
the Revolution, had received a striking lesson of the impolicy
of arbitrary exercise of authority by a general legislative
body. So the Constitution was ratified only on the under-
standing that a "Bill of Rights" should be added, to limit
the power of Congress. In the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion periods another lesson was learned of the danger of arbi-
trary action by local legislatures. So the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, limiting state legislative power, became a part of the
Constitution, and a large proportion of the litigation in the
Federal courts now arises under its provisions.'
Many state constitutions contain Bills of Rights which em-
body statements similar to that of the preamble to the Decla-
ration of Independence, that among "inalienable rights " are
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness "-or, as often ex-
pressed, "life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness"
-and which sometimes also contain a reproduction of that
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids depriva-
tion of life, liberty or property-" without due process of law."
Under this general language it is very easy to declare uncon-
stitutional almost any law which seems to the judiciary im-
1 See "The Fourteenth Amendment," by W. D. Guthrie, p. 27, et
passim.
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politic, especially if the word " liberty" receives the definition
given it by Chief Justice Sharswood-" ' absence of restraint,
except by equal, just and impatial laws." 1
The result of this attitude is the "new canon of constitu-
tional law, viz., that a statute interfering with ' natural rights'
must be shown to be authorized, not that it must be shown to be
prohihited." 2
The advocate of any scheme of constructive legislation has-
thus thrown upon him a double burden of proof He must
not only show a need that will be met by the proposed stat-
ute, must not only show that public policy calls for the law,
but he must go farther and affirmatively prove, to the satis-
faction of the judiciary, that the legislature has the enacting
power. Such decisions as have upheld laws interfering with
"natural rights" have admitted3 a presumption, created by
constitutional Bills of Rights, against the power to enact
such laws, and have rebutted that presumption by call-
ing in another, viz., that all constitutional restrictions leave
untouched the "police power" of the state. This "police
power," which alone can be exercised in abridgment of the
"natural rights of man," is as shadowy and uncertain as are
those rights themselves. No definition is possible. One can
only say that it means the power to pass laws. It cannot
mean laws of any particular kind, for statutes on every
imaginable subject have been held to be within it.
It "is but another name for that authority which resides in
every sovereignty to pass all laws for the internal regulation
I See I Sharswood's Blackstone, p. 127, n. ; also i Lewis's BL. p. 127.
The latter editor adds to Sharwood's note, "Perhaps, however, liberty is
not attained until, as under the Constitution, State and Federal, in the
United States, there is a sphere of individual liberty of action which is
protected from governmental interference, i. e., the right to pursue any
calling."
2Mr. Richard C. McMurtrie, in 32 AM. LAW R-G. (N. S.) 1, 9, January,
1893.
I E.g. "That no general fiower resides in the legislature to regulate
private business, prescribe the conditions under which it shall be con-
ducted, fix the price of commodities or of services, or interfere with
freedom of contracts, we cannot doubt :" Andrews, J., in Peo. v. Budd,
117 N. Y. I, 15 (1889).
GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION CHARGES. 153
and government of the state, necessary for the public wel-
fare;" " nothing more nor less than the power of govern-
ment inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its do-
minions." 2
The limit of its field depends on the court before which the
question comes. The dividing line between this "police
power," this general right of the legislature to pass the laws
it deems best for the well-being of society, on the one hand,
and on the other, the "inalienable natural rights," the consti-
tutional "free-born," "Anglo-Saxon" right not to be bothered
by laws, is drawn, in most instances, not from judicial but
from economic considerations. The decision is apt to be,
because the policy of the law under discussion does not appeal
to the judges, because the "paternal theory of government is
odious" to them, because they think the "happiness" of man-
kind will be best promoted by the least governmental inter-
ference!3
I Peo. v. Budd, 1i7 N. Y. I, I4; 5 L..R. A. 559, 565 (1889), Andrews,J.
2 Taney, C. J., in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583 (1847).
3 The majority opinions in cases pronouncing "interference" laws
unconstitutional, and the dissenting opinions in cases reaching an oppo-
site result, are full of language showing this utter confusion of policy
and power, of legislative and judicial functions. Gordon, J., in God-
ciarles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431 (i886), a "Company Store" case, grows
angry over the "insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative
tutelage." In State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 186 (1889), another case
involving a " Truck Act," Snyder, P., says the law "is a species of sump-
tuary legislation which has been universally condemned, as an attempt
to degrade the intelligence, virtue and manhood of the American laborer
and foist upon the people a paternal government of the most objection-
able character, because it assumes that the employer is a knave and the
laborer an imbecile." It is refreshing to turn from this to the opinion of
I.ucas, P., State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 838 (1892), a case
virtually overruling the preceding. He says, "How far this act may be
objectionable as being what the counsel call 'paternal legislation ' I have
not considered, deeming that a matter for the legislature, not for the
courts." In contrast are the words of Brannon, J., dissenting, at p. 856,
"Vain would be the pursuit of happiness if the right of contract neces-
sary to secure the bread of life and raiment and home be taken away."
Like this is the pathetic language of the New York Court of Appeals in
pronouncing unconstitutional a law prohibiting the manufacture of to-
bacco in tenement house "sweat shops," when it declaims against the
iniquity of "forcing the cigarmaker from his home and its hallowed
154 GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION CHARGES.
A most striking indication of the widespread character of
this belief in implied or general restrictions on legislative
power, is found in the discussion in other states of the pro-
vision in the constitution of the State of Massachusetts, whidh
empowers the legislature "to make, ordain and establish, all
manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes
and ordinances, directions and instructions, either with penal-
ties or without; so as the same be not repugnant or contrary
to this constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of this Commonwealth, and for the government and
ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the same." 1  It is
also declared in the first article that "all men are born free
and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying
and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, pos-
sessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and
associations and beneficent influences :" ReJacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, zr3 (1885).
Mr. Justice Brewer is, perhaps, the most thoroughgoing individualist on
the Supreme Bench, and never hesitates to display his philosophy of
government in his judicial opinions. While a member of the Kansas
court, he said, in a dissenting opinion (State v..Nemaha County, 7 Kans.
542, 554-5 (1871)), "The object of the constitution of a free government
is to grant, not to withdraw, power. . . . The habit of regarding the
legislature as inherently omnipotent, and looking at what express restric-
tions the constitution has placed upon its action, is dangerous, and tends
to error. Rather, regarding first, those essential truths, those axioms of
civil and religious liberty upon which all free governments are founded;
and secondly, statements of principles in the Bill of Rights, upon which
the governmental structure is reared, we may then properly inquire what
powers the words of the constitution, the terms of the grant, convey."
He approves (p. 557) the practice of declaring an act of the legislature
void "because it does not fall within the general grant of power to that
body."
In his dissent, in Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 551 (i89x), the
learned justice avows how "odious" to him is the "paternal theory of
government" and expresses his apprehension that "Looking Backward"
may be "nearer than a dream." Again, dissenting, in Brass v. Stoeser,
153 U. S. 391, 410 (1894), he fears "that the country is rapidly traveling
the road which leads to that point where all freedom of contract and
conduct will be lost." In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1897), hold-
ing constitutional an eight-hour law for miners, Mr. Justice Brewer once
more dissented, but delivered no opinion.
I Mass. Con. 11t. II, ch. r, see. x, art. 4.
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obtaining their safety and happiness." This seems to differ
from corresponding articles of other constitutions only in that
it speaks of "seeking" happiness instead of "pursuing" it.
Nevertheless, the language first quoted has actually been
considered to give the Massachusetts legislature an extraor-
dinary degree. of power, and thus to explain decisions of the
Massachusetts courts upholding laws impairing the freedom of
contract!' The implication being that these laws would be
invalid in the absence of such general grant of power as that
in the article cited. Such ideas go far to show what a pre-
ponderance of authority we have come to assign the judiciary
in the United States.
We find, then, a general prejudice, judicial and lay, against
the power to enact laws regulating contracts. The attempt
to bring any specific statute within the "police power," which
courts allow still resides in legislative bodies, to a greater or
less degree according to the potency assigned in this or that
locality to declarations of rights, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, entails most often a complete examination of the
policy of the proposed law. In no other way can most courts
determine the victory in the battle of Police Power against
Natural Rights.
In the labored effort to find justifications for permitting the
law-making brancl of the government to do here, what it
does in every other county of the globe, without judicial dis-
pute, and as far as concerns the question of power, without
the necessity of justification, many "speculative, if not fan-
ciful reasons have been assigned."' These reasons, the spec-
ulative and fanciful, as well as the solid and substantial, are in
a measure susceptible of classification. The rough outline
given in the first article of this series will here be fol-
lowed?
1 See Ritchie v. Peo., 155 Ills. 98, 115 (1895), where Magruder, J., says
of Comm. v. Mfg. Co., i2o Mass. 385 ( ), "The decision referred to
was evidently made in view of the large discretion so [i. e., in the consti-
tution] vested in the legislative branch of the government." See, also,
Stimsbn's "Handbook of the Labor Laws of the United States," p. 6.
2 Peo. v. Budd, 117 N. Y. x, 25 (1889), Andrews, J.
3 See the December (1898) number of this magazine.
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B. Reasons that have been Advanced for Bringing any -
Specific "Interference" with Contracts within the "Police
Power of the State," Granting an Implied Prohibition of such
Legislation in General.
I. Public Character of Parties to Contract.
(a). Artificial Persons.
(b). Persons under Special Governmental Favor.
Transportation, interference with which is the principal sub-
ject of the present investigation, in modem times is chiefly
carried on by corporations, and by corporations enjoying priv-
ileges, such as that of eminent domain, which would seem to
render them peculiarly liable to state control. Transportation
companies, then, would come under both of the sub-heads
given above, and if the reasons thereby indicated are justified,
if they are not "speculative and fanciful," inquiry as to gov-
ernmental power over transportation contracts need go no
farther.
(a). Arificial Persons.
First, as to the artificial character of the corporate person-
ality. Since the Dartmouth College case all charters are
granted subject to alteration, amendment or repeal. If a
charter, as originally issued, expressly or impliedly allows
the corporation to make such contracts in the course of its
business as it may choose, does the reserved right to alter and
amend of itself justify the state in taking from its creature
the management of the business for which it was created?
The idea that it does, seems to the writer the result of that
metaphysical, strained conception of a corporation as an actual
personality-to be sure, "invisible, intangible" and to be
found "only in contemplation of law"-but still so real as to
take from the consciences of its members air moral responsi-
bility for its actions on the one hand, and on the other hand
to suffer every sort of restriction, attack and deprivation, as
though it were some strange enemy of the people-some sky-
dropping Martian, or, rather, some too-cleverly fashioned
Frankenstein-to be slain. If the government has no right
to interfere with an individual, it certainly has no such right
in case of a partnership, or a limited partnership, or a
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joint stock company. Why is it different with the corpora-
tion, between which and the joint stock company in most
cases only an arbitrary distinction of name exists? "Behind
the artificial body created by the legislature stand the corpo-
rators, natural persons, who have united their means to ac-
•complish an object beyond their individual resources, and
who are as much entitled, under the guaranties of the Consti-
tution, to be secured in the possession and use of their prop-
•erty thus held as before they had associated themselves
together.1
Support has been given this theory, however, not only by
numerous loose expressions in the transportation cases, but
more specifically in at least one case in the Supreme Court of
the United States,2 a case involving governmental regulation
of water rates. Waite, C: J., said (p. 352), "The Spring
Valley Company is an artificial being, created by and under
the authority of the legislature of California, and,
-consequently, this company was, from the moment of its crea-
tion, subject to the legislative power of alteration, and, if
deemed expedient, of absolute extinguishment as a corporate
body . . . (P. 355)- The question here is . . . be-
tween the state and one of its corporations as to what corpo-
rate privileges have been granted. The power to amend cor-
-porate charters is, no doubt, one that bad men may abuse, but
when the amendments are within the scope of the power, the
-courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the legislatures
that have been invested with the authority to make them."
This language, doubtless, was applicable to the peculiar cir-
•cumstances of that case, though it is noteworthy that the in-
terference of the state was justified also on the ground of
" public interest." But other cases, notably those dealing
with laws regulating contracts of employment, have pushed
the theory to its utmost.
In this line of cases stress is laid on the fact that no powers
,of contract or powers of any kind belong to the corporation
SField, J., dissenting, in Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, io
ZT. S. 347, 371 (1884).
2 Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, supra.
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until conferred upon it by the state; that also, under the right
of repeal, all capacities of every sort may be at once with-
drawn, with or without reason assigned. How much more,.
it is urged, ought the state to have the power to modify those
privileges which it alone has granted, and which it alone may
take away.1 But these cases have been disapproved by the
latest expression of judicial opinion on the subject. The Su-
preme Court of Massachusetts,' when asked, "Is it within
the constitutional power of the legislature to extend the appli-
cation of the present law, relative to the weekly payment of
wages by corporations, to private individuals and partnerships
?" replied: "We know of no reason, derived from
the Constitution of the Commonwealth or of the United
States, why there must be a distinction made in respect to,
such legislation between corporations and persons engaged in
manufacturing when both do the same kind of business." The
court points out that the statutes in question do not prport to
be passed for the purpose of restricting the corporate powers of
corporations.
The apparent paradox in the statement that the state may
arbitrarily, if you please, bring a corporation into being, and
likewise deprive it of being, as it may not an individual-while
yet the corporation, during its life, has substantially the same
property and contract rights as the individuals who compose
1 Mr. Justice Brewer, dissenting, in Budd v. New York, i43 U. S. 517,
552 (1892), says: "I believe . . . that government can prescribe com-
pensation only when it grants a special privilege, as in the creation of a
co.poration (italics mine), etc." Braceville Coal Co. v. Peo., x47 l. 66
(1893), pronounced unconstitutional an "interference" law applying to
certain enumerated corporations, in part because the constitution of Illi-
nois forbids amendment of corporate charters by special laws. Shaffer
v. Mining Co., 55 Md. 74 (1874), held valid a "Truck Act" relating to
corporations, while expressing the strongest reprobation of any such re-
striction of individual employers. State v. Browne & Sharpe Mfg. Co.,
18 R. I. i1, 23 At1. 246 (1892); Leep v. R., 58 Ark. 4o7, 25 S. W. 75
(1894) ; Hann v. State, 54 Pac. (Kan.) 13o (1898), accord. The distinc-
tion receives some countenance also in State v. reel Splint Co., 36 W.
Va. 802 (1892). Other cases almost universally have treated all employ-
ers, whether corporations or individuals, as alike subject to, or free from,
such state regulation.
2 Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass. 589 (1895).
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it-is explained very well by Mr. Henry Winslow Williams.'
The divesting of the corporation of control over its contracts,
while it is "still an existing person and recognized as such in
the law," Mr. Williams shows clearly, would operate to re-
strict the rights of the corporators precisely to that extent.
On the contrary, a withdrawal of the charter would leave the
corporators free to act-in their individual capacity with respect
to the property and business formerly controlled by them in
the corporate name. In short, we are brought to the conclu-
sion with which this section began, that partnerships, joint
stock associations and corporations stand, in substance and
reality, on the same footing.
(b). Persons Under Special Governmental Favor.
Under the second sub-head come the "legal monopoly"
theory propounded by Mr. justice Field in his famous dissent
in Munn v. Illinois, and by Mr. Justice Brewer in his equally
well-known opinion in Budd v. New York, and the "enjoy-
ment of public franchise" explanations of legal control of
railway rates.
The principle here indicated is sometimes expressed as
follows: "Where peculiar privileges are granted by the state,
.peculiar responsibilities supervene, and special regulations may
be imposed." 
2
What are these "peculiar privileges?"
They may consist in the monopoly of something before
open to competition. In this case the philosopher of indi-
vidualism should make his objection before the later stage of
mere regulation is reached. Grant the monopoly, and slighter
control certainly follows, as the greater includes the less. Mr.
Justice Brewer says:
"It is suggested that there is a monopoly, and that that
I See Mr. Williams' able article, "An Inquiry into the Nature and
Law of Corporations," 38 AM. LAw Rim. (N. S.), p. 72, et seq., Febru-
.ary, 1899. The statement in the text, of course, does not have reference
to cases in which special reservations of state control have been made in
the original grant. Then the regulation is a part of the contract, and is
exactly what was bargained foe by the natural persons "behind the cor-
poration."
2 State v. Speel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 81x (1892).
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justifies legislative interference. There are two kinds of
monopoly; one of law, the other of fact. The one exists
where exclusive privileges are granted. Such a monopoly, the
law wzkh creates alone can break; and being the creation of
law jusifies legislative control" (italics mine).' Apparently
it does not occur to the learned justice that any
inconsistency is involved in the defence of regulation by
monopoly, of partial control by absolute control. But this
argument supposes first a monopoly, a legal monopoly. How
do you get that monopoly? Without doubt by a species of
"interference" compared with which "regulation" is mild
indeed. Would the situation in Budd v. New York have been
aided had the legislature first declared the elevator business a
monopoly, and then proceeded to specify the rates of compen-
sation ? This question seems to be answered in the asking.
If a business in its nature is incapable of government regula-
tion, it is also incapable of being rendered a monopoly by
governmental action. The "legal monopoly" theory, then,
appears to be a mere truism, or else it is without meaning, as
applied to actual cases.
2
The government may favor corporations of a certain class
by giving them privileges beyond those usually bestowed.
Thus a mining corporation may have added to it the right to
lay out towns, to run a railroad or line of steamers, or to
engage in manufacturing. Such privileges have been held in
some cases to give the legislature control over the benefici-
aries to a degree beyond that over persons or corporations
not so favored If the right to interfere was reserved by the
state as a condition of the additional grant, certainly it would
be a part of the contract, and its exercise can become no
cause of complaint to the corporators. But in any other case,
I Budd v. New York, dissenting opinion, 143 U. S. 517, 550 (1892).
2 It would seem that Allnut V. Inglis, 12 East, 527 (I8io), the case of
the London wharfingers, which the dissenting justices in the various
grain elevator cases have declared to be no precedent for regulation,
because of the legal monopoly there involved, is really a precedent, if
for anything, not only for what was alleged, but even for more than
anything now contemplated in this country.
3 See the West Virginia cases, sufira.
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the same objections would seem to apply here, as to the theory
based on the original bestowal of corporate privileges. Be-
sides, to continue the mining illustration, a regulation such as
the eight-hour law upheld in Holden v. Hardy,1 or a "Screen
Act,"' which should be valid as to mines owned by specially
favored corporations, but invalid as to mines owned by ordi-
nary corporations or by individuals, would be absurd in its
inefficiency.
Again the "special privileges" may consist in the grant of
a "public franchise" or license for carrying on a business
necessarily involving the exercise of some prerogative of the
state, as eminent domain, or the use of the public highways
on land or water. A discussion of this topic will run almost
indistinguishably into that on the second sub-head of the
second section, viz.: the "Contract of Public Service." An
employment carried on under a public franchise will of neces-
sity be a "public" employment, and an employment recog-
nized as public will for that reason require for its license a
"public" franchise. Each is the-cause and each the result of
the other. The "eminent domain" branch of the state pre-
rogative is perhaps the one really noteworthy in this connec-
tion. Just the weight which should be attached to it must be
determined by an historical view of the legal control of com-
mon carriers, to inquire whether this regulation was exercised
before or after the prerogative of eminent domain commonly
"subsisted in the hands of a subject." This will involve
the further inquiry whether all matters of business now con-
sidered public in the legal sense, were not so at the start in
the "virtual" or actual sense only, first affecting people gen-
erally in their private capacity, and then as a result drawing
down the attention of the nation; and whether grants of
powers like eminent domain, and regulations limiting the right
1 i69 U. S. 366 (1897), Brown, J.
2 Like the one pronounced void in Commonwealth v. Brown, 8 Pa.
Super. 339, affirmitg 6 D. R. 773 (I898). The opinion of Rice, P. J., is
remarkable for the failure to notice the recent decisions upholding legis-
lation of the kind before the court. The earlier West Virginia and Massa-
chusetts cases are treated at length, but the later decisions practically
overruling the others are entirely ignored.
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of contract, instead of being in the relation of cause and
effect, may not rest on a common basis, i. e., the public interest
in the business. And it may be suggested that possibly the.
habit of mind which seeks explanations such as those here
treated, may be that which "reads its fundamental ideas .. .
back into history.'" The discussion under the "Contract of
Public Service" will include the matters here touched upon.
2. Public Subject Matter of Contract.
.(a). Sale of Public Commodity.
Certain species of property have been considered not capa-
ble of complete private ownership, but to belong to the people
in general, or the state. Among these are wild animals -and
things of a similar nature. In Geer v. State of Connecdcut,2
Mr. Justice White, quoting from Pothier,3 classes among res
communes air, water which runs in rivers, the sea and its
shores, and animals ferw nature, and shows that property in
wild beasts is regarded as common or in the state over all the
continent of Europe. Blackstone' also classes wild animals
with air, light and water as peculiarly subject to governmental
authority. In the case cited it was held (Harlan and Field,
JJ., dissenting, and Brewer and Peckham, JJ., taking no
part in the decision), that ownership of game within the
limits of a state, so far as it is capable of ownership, is in the
state for the benefit of all its people in common, and that the
police power authorizes a state to forbid the killing of game
to be transported beyond its limits. A similar decision was
Lawton v. Steele,5 Fuller, C. J., Brewer and Field, JJ., dis-
senting. In AcCready v. Virginia," the power of the State
ISee article by Dr. Wm. Draper Lewis, 36 Am. L: Reg. (N. S.) p. 4,
January, 1897.
2 I6i U. S. 519, I6 S. C. 6oo (1896).
3 Pothier Trait du Droit de Proprieti, No. 2z. See also Code Napo-
leon (Articles 714, 715).
4 2 Bl. Com. 14, 394, 410.
5 152 U. S. r33, r4 Sup. Ct 499 (1894). The statute in question, which
was decided constitutional, declared nets, etc., used in violation of game
laws public nuisances, which the official game protectors were authorized
to destroy.
6 94 U. S. 395 (1876).
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of Virginia to restrict the planting of oysters was upheld. In
Commonwealth v. Gilbert' a statute imposed a penalty on
every person who "sells or offers or exposes for sale, or has
in his possession a trout," except alive, during the close sea-
son. This statute was decided to apply constitutionally to
trout artificially propagated and maintained. In Gendle v.
State,2 a statute wag decided to be constitutional which
forbade the taking of any fish in any way for two years,
even by an owner of the lake or stream. So, in People v.
Bridges,3 an anti-seine law was held to include within its pro-
hibition a lake wholly upon lands of a private owner and
unconnected with other waters except with a small, unnavi-
gable stream, and that only at flood time.
People's Gas. Co. v. Tyner, 5 following the Pennsylvania case
of Westmoreland, Etc., Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 6 classes water, oil
and gas as minerals ferm naturae subject to the same public
control as wild animals. 7 Accordingly, in the recent Indiana
case of Townsend v. State,' it was decided that an act punish-
ing the wasteful burning of natural gas in flambeau lights
does not deprive the owner of property without due process
of law, nor does it violate the rights of "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness."' The Supreme Courts of both Indiana
1 i6O Mass. 157, 35 N. B. 454 (1893).
2 29 Ind. 409, at 415 (1868).
s 142 Ills. 3o, z6 L. R. A. 684 (1892).
' On game and game laws see 8 Am. & Bng. Ency. Law, ro24, et seg.
Domestic animals cannot be controlled in the same manner, of course,
since there is no public ownership. See City of Helena v. Dwyer (Ark.),
39 L. R. A. 266 (1897), a case in which an ordinance forbidding the sale
of fresh pork between June ist and October ist was held void as violating
the inalienable right of man to procure food.
6 131 Ind. 277, at 281, 282 (x892).
6 130 Pa. 235, I8 Atl. 724 (1889).
T The reasons for classing gas and oil among the res communes appear
to be as strong as those placing water there. The same fugitive char-
acter marks all, and it seems that if the hydro-carbon fluids had been
known in the days of Pothier and Blackstone, their classification would
have been extended to include them.
a 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. U. 19 (1897), McCabe, J.
9 This marks another successful attempt of the Indiana legislature to
control the use of natural gas. State v. Gas Co., x2o Ind. 575, 22 N. E.
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and Pennsylvania thus contend that the ownership of gas and
oil in their natural condition, as well as that of wild animals,
is in the state, which accordingly can make such regulations
concerning them as it sees fit. If these decisions be sound it
would appear that the state may prescribe the exact manner
in which the owners shall use the gas and oil they have drawn
from their own land, or fix arbitrarily the prices at which
these articles shall be sold, or even prohibit absolutely their
use in any form. This ought to furnish a short and easy way
with the Standard Oil Company. It would seem from these de-
cisions that the company is making its millions a month from
the sale of a commodity which in its natural condition really
belongs to the state.
Land itself, in its "wild" and unimproved state, has never
been considered capable of complete private ownership in
England. That fact has been used to explain the Irish Land
Acts, which violate what in this country would be called the
vested property and contract rights of the landlords: The
villainous system of "rack-renting," which we have heard
attacked so eloquently here and which, in our sympathy for
the wrongs of Ireland, we have come to believe the very
essence of evil, is nothing in the world but "freedom of con-
tract," applied to the land. Here the advocates of land
nationalization or rent confiscation have not yet succeeded in
influencing legislation.
Those who favor the nationalization of railroads and other
transportation systems, as being what are called "natural
monopolies" and, therefore, rightfully the property of all in-
stead of the few, if successful in their schemes would render
unnecessary any discussion such as the present. That which
778 (1889), declared unconstitutional a law prohibiting the piping of
natural gas to any point without the state. This law (which was passed
because of the projected piping of gas from the Indiana districts to Chi-
,cago) was said not to be a legitimate exercise of police power, but an
attempt to regulate interstate commerce. ButJamieson v. Oil Co., 128
Ind. 555, 28 N. B. 76 (z891), Olds, J., dissenting, held constitutional an
act prohibiting a pressure of more than 300 pounds to the inch, which
was designed to accomplish indirectly, the same end as that to which the
former statute was directed.
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belongs to the state, certainly the state could control, and the
traffic in transportation facilities would then be the "sale of a
public commodity." The countries of continental Europe
have quite generally acquired the property in their railroads
and street-car lines. Switzerland has just within a few months
voted for state purchase of its railroads.
This consummation, to be dreaded or desired, is a possi-
bility of interest as the pole which has as its opposite entire
non-intervention, a policy contended for by many individualists
in the United States, but never actually adopted anywhere. We
in America have sought for fifty years a halting-place between
these extremes. For half a century we have had little or no
state or municipal ownership and apparently little demand for
it. But an agitation seems to have begun, in Chicago particu-
larly, for city ownership of street railways. The effect of this
lies in the future. Just now the discussion under this sub-
head that is chiefly pertinent to the present inquiry, relates to
the early common law regulation of wharfingers, as bearing
on the vexed question of "virtual" monopolies, already re-
ferred to.1
The treatise De Paribus Mars, of Lord Hale, cited in
pretty nearly all the cases dealing with government regulation
of contract, asserts that the charges of "public" wharves
must be reasonable, "because they are the wharves only li-
censed by the Queen, or because there is no other wharf in that
port." The italicized words have aroused great controversy.
The individualists have given an explanation which is pro-
nounced "fanciful " by Andrews, J., of the New York Court
1It is hard to understand why so much has been said of the common
law rules on this particular topic. Everybody knows that contempora-
neously with the writing of Lord Hale's treatise, there prevailed all kinds
of government interference with all kinds of things; and also that little
time was wasted by the "practical" men who shaped legislation, in elab-
orating this or that theoretic justification of their action. It is not to be
supposed that the statutory enactments alone were mediaeval and that
the judge-made common law, which in its sacred purity descended to us
and furnished the rule by which to measure the grants and reservations
of power in our written constitutions, is entirely susceptible of explana-
tion on modern American theories.
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of Appeals,' but which has the high support of the late
Justice Cooley: " . . . The title to the soil under navi-
gable water in England is in the Crown, and ... wharves
can only be erected by express or implied license, and can
only be made available by making use of this public property
in- the soil (italics mine.) If, then, by public permission,
one is making use of the public property, and he claims
to be, the only one with whom the public can deal in
respect to the use of that property, it seems entirely rea-
sonable to say that his business is affected with a public
interest which requires him to deal with the public on
reasonable terms" -- or, as it might be expressed, he is sell-
ing a privilege (wharfage) which belongs to the state. There
are two objections to this argument: (I) It ignores the
fact that the property of the Crown in the soil under navi-
gable water was only presumptive, and might be rebutted by
evidence of grant, express or implied; and the further fact
that no difference is made in the books, as to the necessity of
reasonable charge, between wharves erected on private and
those on public soil. The same was true of ferries. "No
man could set up a ferry, although he owned the soil and land-
ing- places on both sides of the stream, without a charter from
the King, or a prescription, time out of mind. The franchise
to establish ferries was a royal prerogative" which
i" was vested in the King, as a means by which a business,
in which the whole community were interested, could be regu-
lated." -
(2) It gives the statement of Lord Hale, viz., that pri-
vate property "affected with a public interest ceases to be
juris privati only," a restricted meaning no hint of which is
found in De Portibu Mar/s, or in contemp6rary reports and
treatises. This acceptance of the decision, qualified by sup-
plemental or different reasons therefor, comes dangerously
near treating the words of the jurist "as the utterances of
I Peo. v. Budd, r17 N. Y. 1, 25 (1889).
2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 738.
3Andrews, J., in Peo. v. Budd, sufira, at p. 17.
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Balaam's ass-absolutely true, but not proceeding from any
conscious intelligence."
On the whole, it may safely be said that government own-
ership of the article or privilege sold is of very little present
bearing, theoretic or practical, on the control of transportation
charges in the United States.
(To be continued.)
